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Reconciliation and Justice after
Genocide: A Theoretical Exploration
Geneviève Parent
Laurentian University
This article argues that the post-conflict reconciliation process is undermined by
the importance given to the retributive form of justice dominating peacebuilding and transitional justice measures. Retributive justice reinforces the division
between perpetrator and victim, thus undermining the reconciliation process between
antagonistic parties. The so-called objective categories of perpetrator and victim, so
crucial for the administration and management of most peacebuilding measures,
underestimate the individual and collective psychological dimension and intersubjective effects that these categories have upon the healing and reconciliation processes. The significance of the psychological dimension of reconciliation suggests
a restorative justice approach that emphasizes the subjective and intersubjective
meanings of justice and reconciliation. The case of post-genocide Rwanda will be
used to show how the retributive justice approach can undermine the reconciliation process.
Key words: reconciliation, genocide, restorative justice, retributive justice,
psychological healing

Transitional justice refers to a number of peacebuilding measures that are internationally, nationally, and/or locally rooted, such as international tribunals, amnesties,
truth commissions, criminal trials, reparation programs, and memorials. Despite these
various efforts and despite the growing body of literature on transitional justice, it
remains unclear if and how these activities contribute to post-conflict reconciliation processes. This article seeks to contribute to the discussion through an interdisciplinary reading of the relationship between the form of justice being administered
and post-conflict reconciliation, notably through an exploration of the significance of
the psychological dimension in post-conflict societies.
The article begins by discussing reconciliation, and how the concept relates
crucially to the concept of justice. In view of the former’s function in post-conflict
peacebuilding settings, there is a critical need to refine the vague and confusing
reconciliation concept and to discuss its relationship to the concept of justice. The
increasingly prevailing ‘‘retributive’’ form of justice of contemporary peacebuilding
efforts, it is argued, produces an unnecessary paradox or misleading choice between
dispensing justice and promoting peace and reconciliation (the famous justice versus
peace ‘‘dilemma’’). A ‘‘restorative’’ form of justice, on the other hand, can promote
both justice and reconciliation. It is argued that the rigid and static victim and
perpetrator labels not only poorly reflect fluid and changing sets of identities (e.g.,
victim, defender, caretaker, perpetrator, hero, mother, father) but also lead to
increasing animosity between antagonistic groups. The argument presented here
thus emphasizes the psychological and intersubjective dimensions of civil war and
genocide survivors’ experiences that have to be taken into account to guarantee the
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success and durability of the reconciliation process. It will also examine the conflictual nature and dynamics of reconciliation so as to underline how reconciliation can
be influenced by the form of justice privileged in transitional periods. To ignore these
aspects is to seriously jeopardize the medium and long-term prospects of reconciliation processes.

Post-conflict Reconciliation
How can reconciliation be possible? It is very difficult. I cannot reconcile with the
person who killed members of my family. He cannot bring them back, he cannot erase
the pain . . . Nothing of them (family members) is left. It is as if they never existed.1

In spite of extensive interest in post-conflict reconciliation, the concept remains unclear and loosely used by both scholars and political actors. While this ambiguity
can serve many social and political purposes, it also leads to a number of assumptions about the links between reconciliation and other crucial concepts, such as
justice, forgiveness, truth, healing, peace, and so on. Some argue or simply assume
that these concepts are part of reconciliation,2 while others question these takenfor-granted relationships.3
Despite the need to challenge the assumed relationship between reconciliation
and numerous other concepts, a recurrent theme is that reconciliation, somehow,
helps people to heal. In fact, healing is a pervasive term in the literature on reconciliation4 and the latter is even often confused with healing.5 What and who needs
to be healed or what kind of healing is necessary for reconciliation to take place is
unclear. Some explicitly indicate that post-conflict individual wounds need healing.
Nevertheless, a broad understanding includes the healing of social relations.6 Some
authors also point to the importance of healing individual post-conflict wounds—
notably psychological ones—for reconciliation to occur.7 Healing seemingly has an
influence on reconciliation. The antagonistic parties go through some sort of healing
for reconciliation to occur.
There is little agreement beyond (an essentially implicit) healing on what reconciliation really means. Daly and Sarkin highlight the irony that a term that evokes
cohesion has so many divergent meanings, sometimes even competing ones, ranging
from not killing each other to the equivalent of ‘‘a national hug.’’ 8 For example, Ross
refers to reconciliation as a continuum where we find different degrees of reconciliation.9 Congruent with this continuum, recent literature tends to see reconciliation
as a goal and a process. Several authors emphasize the transformative, dynamic,
and conflictual aspects of the reconciliation process.10 Indeed, reconciliation is not a
progressive linear process.
Accordingly, reconciliation is better understood as a societal process where
each party is supposed to acknowledge the other and the other’s sufferings, where
antagonistic parties are to move onto constructive attitudes and behaviors, and/or
where individual and collective relationships of trust are (re)built.11 This social
process, however, entails a significant psychological dimension: ‘‘a changed psychological orientation toward the other.’’ 12 More often than not, the members of antagonistic groups must overcome perceptions and feelings of enmity that are often based
upon horrific personal experiences and/or upon demonizing and dehumanizing representations of the ‘‘other.’’ The psychological challenge, both individual and collective,
is double: (1) to overcome the psychological effects of terrible war experiences; and (2)
to see the (old) enemy as a fellow human being with whom it is possible to coexist.
Hence, in the end, post-conflict reconciliation involves not only trust and constructive
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attitudes or imposed peacebuilding measures, but recognizing the humanity of the
‘‘other’’; that is, the ‘‘other’s’’ needs, interests, understandings, and perceptions of
war, peace, and even reconciliation. Reconciliation might be a very complex social
process, but it requires more than material reparations and the administration of
(retributive) justice. To be effective, it must also include a significant psychological
healing dimension that requires transforming the psychological orientation of antagonistic groups and individuals toward each other. As it is argued below, this emphasis
on the psychological dimension entails redefining the relationship between reconciliation and (restorative) justice. But first, I must elaborate on the importance of
the psychological dimension, notably in the context of a divided society.

Considering the Psychological Dimension in a Divided Society
Reconciliation is always difficult to achieve in post-conflict societies, and even more
so in the context of deeply divided societies fractured by cycles of extreme violence
and/or genocide. The one-size-fits-all characteristic of many peacebuilding and transitional justice measures do not make the task of reconciliation easier. Daly and
Sarkin suggest that reconciliation measures should be shaped to include three criteria:
(1) the general context before the transitional period (the nature of human rights
violations, for instance); (2) the nature of the transition (if it took place by force, by
negotiation, or otherwise); and (3) the social and political conditions going into the
reconciliation process (the victim–perpetrator ratio, socio-economic conditions, and
so on).13 It seems that, the more extreme the violence and the war crimes, the more
emphasis should be put on the psychological dimension for a ‘‘successful’’ reconciliation process.14 Also, coerced participation in reconciliation will not lay the ground for
one’s empowerment. It does not encourage one to assume a sense of responsibility
for his/her actions, or to adopt a sense of engagement either. Any imposed reconciliation measure will bring little to no relief on one’s post-conflict wounds, or change
one’s psychological orientation toward the other. Despite the unique experiences of
each country, there is growing evidence that a deeply divided society necessitates
the prioritization of the psychological dimension.15
Some scholars contend that liberal institutions are necessary for durable peace
and/or that socio-economic changes are as important for reconciliation as psychological healing. Lipschutz16 and Hutchison and Bleiker,17 among others, argue that the
exclusive restoration of state institutions and of the economy is insufficient to repair
the damaged or broken down relationships after years of violence and war. Without
the healing of individual wounds and (re)building of relationships between individuals
and groups, the capacity and ability of the citizens to participate in development
work are hampered, thus, weakening the communities’ capacity to fight poverty.
This sort of argument and debate reflects the complexity in implementing reconciliation processes.
Reconciliation is made more complex by the question of the level at which reconciliation should take place: local, national, or international. At the level of individuals,
the focus is on the experience of the individuals who are or were affected by the armed
conflict. The emphasis is, for instance, upon the relationship between individual
victims and perpetrators. At the level of the community, peacebuilding reconciliation
implies engaging the former enemy groups/communities, involving both internal and
intergroup social dynamics. It is, however, at the national level that one finds the
bulk of the literature on liberal peacebuilding, state-building, and transitional justice.
It is also and mostly at this level that the international community directs its
demands for reconciliation. Hence, reconciliation considers the meaning of ‘‘peace’’
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Genocide Studies and Prevention 5:3 December 2010

between government and the rebel group(s), implies adopting and implementing
better policies, building ‘‘liberal’’ institutions, and changing the attitudes and
behaviors of those in power.18 Within this framework, internally displaced persons
are often marginalized, although many have warned that they must be considered
because they can greatly exacerbate problems and obstruct reconciliation.19 Since
transitional countries have little resources, the need is to target problems efficiently
in order to determine at which level reconciliation programs should be aimed and
work best.20
The question of the relevant level of reconciliation largely depends on ‘‘who is
looking at it.’’ In academia for instance, political scientists tend to put more emphasis
on the state,21 whereas social psychologists tend to focus on individuals and increasingly on social groups.22 Although some put forward a multilevel approach,23 it is
far from a predominant approach to the problem of reconciliation. In practice, the
importance of the psychological dimension of reconciliation is much more explicit at
the local and social/community levels (e.g., local initiatives, NGOs, etc.), while it
tends to be ignored, dismissed, and/or minimized by national and international
peacebuilders (e.g., international courts, state/nation-building efforts, etc.). Attention
should be paid to this issue because reconciliation is almost always working at
all levels simultaneously, but not necessarily harmoniously. Hence, differences in
purposes or objectives are reflected in the respective levels, contradicting or working
against each other. It is important to have a global perspective on reconciliation
where all levels are considered. The variety of different understandings of reconciliation must bring scholars and stakeholders from different fields and perspectives
together—examining the affinities and tensions—in order to bridge the division and
have a holistic and inclusive approach to reconciliation. This diversity should be an
opportunity to engage into dialogue with others—all parts of a whole—to challenge
one’s own understanding or to explore new understandings rather than to divide
each into camps of like-minded individuals in order to strengthen one’s own viewpoints. Otherwise, efforts at one or more level(s) could work against other level(s).
Processes of reconciliation will or will not foster sustainable peace, but they will
transform individuals, communities, groups, and their interrelationships.
To be effective, the reconciliation process must proceed bottom-up and top-down
simultaneously. Indeed, individuals are the fundamental elements of society and
widespread trauma throughout the population negatively affects all possible levels
of reconciliation.24 Most importantly, while the physical and mental health of
individuals is crucial for national reconciliation, national reconciliation has no immediate, automatic, or necessary effect upon individual well-being.25 A government can
promote individual reconciliation through ‘‘genuine commitment’’ and ‘‘conciliatory
acts’’ done in public, which are accompanied by other initiatives such as funding
direct assistance to survivors or supporting public education. In short, citizens have
to believe that the government is genuinely seeking reconciliation. In the context of a
divided society, the importance of the psychological dimension—extreme traumatization of the citizens—is substantiated by a number of defining features. For instance,
a divided society is characterized by the geographic proximity of the antagonistic
parties (often living as neighbors); by the perpetuation of conflicts across generations; by the lines of conflicts that are drawn from regional, religious, and/or ethnic
affiliations where one group oppressed the other; and by direct violence infliction.26
The experience of civil war is thus very different from the experience of interstate
war because it often questions and challenges the very nature and/or raison d’être of
the society at (civil) war.
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In short, without overlooking socio-economic realities and other ‘‘objective’’
factors, defining reconciliation in terms of (re)building individual relationships
and taking into consideration the importance of the psychological dimension of
reconciliation—conceived as more subjective in the literature—facilitates the establishment of a basis from which broader social relationships can be (re)built.
Especially in the context of a divided society, it is imperative that national reconciliation initiatives resonate and/or concur with lower levels of reconciliation: the
social/community and individual levels. As pointed out by Hamber, it has become
critical that more attention is given to mental health in post-conflict political processes27 and, as we will see in the upcoming section, in the field of transitional
justice.
This argument is reflected in the literature on reconciliation in the social
psychology field. Nadler and Schnabel distinguish between instrumental and socioemotional reconciliation. Socio-emotional reconciliation involves a deeper and more
complex transformative aspect than instrumental reconciliation. Thereby, each is
said to fit best with different contexts. Instrumental reconciliation is better suited
to a context of international or interstate conflict where ‘‘separated’’ coexistence is
possible. Socio-emotional reconciliation is better adapted to an intranational context
or intra-social conflicts28 where coexistence seems inescapable (for whatever reason)
and where one peaceful single social/national unit seems the key objective of
reconciliation. Instrumental reconciliation is oriented toward the present, whereas
socio-emotional reconciliation is oriented toward the past and the future. To be
more specific, instrumental reconciliation focuses on ongoing repetitive cooperative
projects, while socio-emotional reconciliation first focuses on the confrontation of
the conflicted past, where both recognition of past wrongdoings and pleading for
forgiveness (however defined) will lay a foundation for building future ‘‘relationships
of interdependence in a single unit.’’
Instrumental reconciliation has the ‘‘advantage’’ of being based upon ‘‘objective’’
indicators and factors like economic and political institutions. Moreover, the ‘‘objective’’ characteristics of instrumental reconciliation work well with and serve the
retributive understanding of justice underpinning contemporary peacebuilding and
transitional justice processes well. Socio-emotional reconciliation, grounded in subjective interrelationships, is less amenable and useful to ‘‘concrete’’ national and
international peacebuilding practices and policies. However, not only the ‘‘subjective’’
characteristics of socio-emotional reconciliation concur with one’s own healing; they
lay the groundwork for one’s psychological orientation toward the other. The restorative
form of justice suits best the subjective and intersubjective needs of a deeply divided
society for socio-emotional reconciliation.
Nevertheless, it is not enough to examine and to emphasize the psychological
dimension of reconciliation. If this dimension is to be taken seriously, it must come
with an appreciation of the relationship between reconciliation and the form of justice that is promoted or sought. Building on an examination of the case of Rwanda,
the rest of this article explores the consequences of the retributive form of justice
upon reconciliation and how a restorative form of justice coupled with an emphasis
on the psychological dimension can better foster peace and reconciliation.

Reconciliation and the Retributive Form of Justice
There is little agreement about what transitional justice involves. This is understandable because of each country’s unique features (social, legal, economical, and
political dynamics) and the complexity of (re)building post-conflict societies.29 In
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addition, there is a wide range of possibilities and intertwined approaches to reconciliation, justice, and reconstruction.
Justice can be interpreted in numerous ways.30 Yet, as used in the peacebuilding
literature, justice as transitional justice is a concept often minimally based upon
post-conflict survivors’ experiences and upon very little input from conflict survivors
and victims. Despite numerous attempts and claims to the objective status of justice,
justice can be a highly subjective and intersubjective notion that varies according to
context, group membership, and/or personal experiences. Justice is not universal.31
And yet, in practice, trials have been increasingly favored in transitional societies:
‘‘Practioners in the field argue that there is no peace and no reconciliation without
punitive justice.’’ 32 Moreover, the Western ‘‘universal’’ focus on retributive justice is
often imposed as a post-conflict solution in war-torn societies.33 In practice, however,
the majority of individuals who have committed mass atrocities have not been held
accountable or punished. In the scholarship on transitional justice, it is also assumed
or explicitly claimed that retributive justice should be prioritized in societies divided
by mass violence. Some will go as far as conceiving justice as obviously retributive
and they will assume the relationship between retributive justice and reconciliation
as natural and/or logical:
When justice is done, and seen to be done, it provides a catharsis for those physically
or psychologically scarred by violations of international humanitarian law. Deepseated resentments—key obstacles to reconciliation—are removed and people on
different sides of the divide can feel that a clean slate has been provided for.34

This understanding of justice necessarily implies acts of ‘‘injustice’’ or ‘‘wrongs’’
that must be addressed and rectified through a prism of justice. However, retribution
is not necessary to initiate a transition process toward stability and peace.35 Retributive justice’s primary aim is to punish the offender. At best, a victim gets to be
considered as an ‘‘official victim’’ and is given an opportunity to testify in a trial,
while the administrators, legislators, prosecutors, and judges are the ones who retain
the ultimate power to impose (or not) a punishment. In short, retributive justice
essentially constitutes ‘‘a transaction between the state and the offender.’’ 36 Claims
and assumptions about how retributive justice satisfies the needs and interests of
victims seem to ignore the bitter realities of a trial process and victims’ experiences
of that process. Indeed, these claims and assumptions about retributive justice are
challenged and recognized as erroneous in the fields of law and criminology.37
Here, I am not particularly concerned about how (transitional) justice can be
understood and conceived in different cultural contexts, but how a retributive form
of justice can affect reconciliation, notably in terms of the individual psychology of
victims of war.

Rwanda
Three levels of transitional justice can be been identified in Rwanda: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the formal criminal trials at the
national level, and the gacaca courts at the local level.38 After the genocide, the
government of Rwanda and the international community put much emphasis on
holding perpetrators accountable. Fighting impunity was at the core of the Rwandan
government’s policies, in conjunction with other measures to promote national
reconciliation.
In the context of a post-conflict divided society, within the retributive form of
justice framework, the concepts of victim and perpetrator tend to be conceived in
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dichotomous terms: creating two distinct, mutually exclusive, and homogeneous
social groups. Victims are conceived as the passive objects of direct violence that
become visible only when perpetrators use that violence against them. In some cases,
the dichotomy has crucial political effects by generating two social groups that are
diametrically opposed, thus simplifying the process of identification of who is the
victim and who is the aggressor/perpetrator. This oversimplification is disconnected
from the reality of many post-conflict situations, does not reflect the complexity of
victimization during conflict, and often defines individual identities as solely that
of victim or perpetrator.39 Following the harmful act, the victim not only faces
numerous consequences and needs, but he/she can ultimately lose control of his/her
life. Retributive justice processes depend on the perpetrator to proceed: no perpetrator means no criminal justice process. Moreover, in the event where a monetary
compensation for the victim might be considered, the insolvability of the perpetrator leaves the victim with little to no monetary aid to cope with his/her postvictimization consequences and needs. Hence, the victim’s loss of control over his/
her life is perpetuated through the retributive justice system’s dependency on the
perpetrator.40 Retributive justice processes are adversarial, and both victims and
perpetrators are victimized through them. The victim and perpetrator categories are
established, reinforced, and polarized via an increased victimhood of both sides
brought about by the system’s adversarial procedures.
In the case of Rwanda, there is growing acknowledgment that reconciliation requires more than the prosecutions of the key génocidaires by international and national
courts. The international community put great faith into gacaca—encouraging confessions, denunciations, and plea bargaining—for encouraging individual and social
reconciliation at least.41 However, in Rwanda, gacaca was ‘‘adapted’’ and it seems
to have become essentially a retributive tool to punish Hutu.42 Waldof even suggests
that gacaca might represent a social control tool for the government. The author
explains that gacaca, by facilitating mass accusations of Hutu men, not only promotes a collective Hutu guilt, but it can also be used to disenfranchise a significant
number of Hutu voters.43 As such, this ‘‘tool’’ does not seem to meet the victims’
expectations, making them hesitant about any form of reconciliation.44 The following
testimonies are common:
I have gotten to know many (men) without my consent. . . . I discovered I am HIV
positive. I live in very bad conditions because I didn’t go to school (because of the
genocide). I have no job and am too weak now to dig the fields. I get food from an
organization that helps me to survive. . . . I don’t think I can forgive the FAR soldiers
or the Interahamwe. I don’t want to hear about reconciliation. I accused them in the
gacaca courts, including the one who raped me, those who participated in the killings
in the church and those I saw at the roadblock, but now they are being released.
Gacaca courts do not bring justice . . .
I don’t go to the gacaca courts anymore, because the people we are accusing are being
released. I don’t see the point in taking the risk of sharing my testimony there if it
doesn’t make any difference . . .
I feel the Interahamwe militia and FAR soldiers killed what I would have become.
I am HIV positive. I am not able to work, because I am very weak and constantly
ill. I suffer from headaches, chest aches, backaches, and pains in my vagina, and I
have sinus problems as a result of the men who raped me in the nose . . . Some of
the Interahamwe militiamen who raped me were imprisoned, but they are now being
released. This is not justice. Gacaca courts were supposed to bring justice and reconciliation, but they are bringing more tears than smiles.45
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While in Rwanda silence remains on the alleged RPF war crimes, the number of
Hutu suspected of being génocidaires keeps on increasing.46 Gacaca played an important role in the staggering increased number of accused génocidaires.47 It appears to
encourage an ‘‘exclusive’’ form of justice rather than an ‘‘inclusive’’ form where all
parties recognize their deeds and the others’ sufferings, even if they are of different
nature and degree. In fact, increasing literature indicates that the gacaca courts
seem to be skewed against Hutu. For instance, the Rwandan ambassador to Belgium
indicated that the number of suspected génocidaires was close to two million, which
approximated the number of Hutu male in that period.48 As Mamdani wrote,
Every time I visited post-genocide Rwanda, I would ask responsible state officials . . .
how many ordinary civilians they thought had participated in the genocide. Every
time the answer was in the millions. Even more troubling, the estimate grew with
each visit.49

Participation at gacaca courts is mandatory. Despite the much projected image of
unanimous Rwandan consensus and support for gacaca initiatives—which might
have been genuine in the beginning—many Tutsi have become afraid to participate
and to testify with reason: a number of Tutsi have been intimidated, physically
assaulted, and even killed before or after their participation at gacaca courts. Tutsi
are more insecure since they are often harassed by the families of the individual who
killed their relatives. This trend has clearly augmented since 2003, when the first
waves of perpetrators/génocidaires were released. Hutu are also afraid of the gacaca
courts since they fear being wrongly accused and/or imprisoned.50
Furthermore, while the number of guilty has been growing, an increasing
number of Rwandans find it more difficult to be recognized as victims since the
genocide. The Hutu who resisted during the genocide, who tried to save or saved
Tutsi relatives, friends, or neighbors, are not recognized as victims or survivors,
while the government tends to naturally label them as génocidaires or accomplices.
Many Hutu were also hunted and killed following the genocide by RPF and the
Rwandan Patriotic Army. Others died in overcrowded refugee camps in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).51 The ‘‘mixed’’ Rwandans also do not appear to
meet the criteria of victim. For instance, having one Tutsi parent and one Hutu
parent seems to encourage feelings of suspicion about one’s involvement in the
genocide, whether as a passive accomplice or as an active killer agent.52 Tutsi and
Hutu live in fear and most are too afraid to talk about the current situation, their
experience related to the circumstances that led to their victimization, or to their
participation in violence. The official ‘‘unity’’ policy appears to exacerbate the rift
between Tutsi and Hutu.
Since the 2003 constitution, the use of the words Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa is illegal
in public discourse and is punishable by law. However, despite the fact that the
identities are officially silenced, the stigmatization and marginalization associated
with them remain and are flourishing. This is largely explained by the fact that the
ethnic identities Tutsi and Hutu have become associated with the identities of victim
and perpetrator/génocidaire, respectively:
In Rwanda, a Hutu is a perpetrator and a Tutsi is a victim. Because I am Hutu, I am
unable to go back to Rwanda to find out who killed my family and why. I cannot see
the house, nothing. Without any answer, it is impossible for me to get closure. I suffer
great pain.53
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Vidal suggests that the ban on public references to ethnic identity facilitates the link
between Hutu and génocidaire since it leads all to forget that Hutu are not all guilty
and that some were in fact courageous and/or victimized.54 Also, it has been much
more difficult to remember and recognize that many Hutu suffered and are suffering
since the word Hutu is publicly banned. Hintjens explains that the ‘‘victims’’ in
Rwanda—whether they were in exile or in Rwanda—are connected by ‘‘a common
persecution and their victimizers, as a whole, are to blame’’ for it.55 The dichotomy
Tutsi/Hutu is very palpable and perpetuating. The Tutsi constitute an ‘‘us’’; the
Hutu represent the ‘‘other.’’ Twa remain invisible/non-existent. Dichotomous identities are implicitly intertwined with the victim/perpetrator dualism, making both
dichotomies mutually reinforcing. Both dichotomies have been enforced by Rwandan
political programs and initiatives such as the imposition of an official one-sided and
exclusive memory.
The question of historical memory, both individual and collective, is crucial to
the victim’s psychological rehabilitation, and thus to the reconciliation process. And
yet each commemoration does not recognize explicitly the massacred Hutu, thus
reinforcing the Hutu’s collective guilt. Buckley-Zistel contends that each commemoration appears to further create negative emotions and negative cognitive perceptions for both Tutsi and Hutu.56 For Tutsi, being reminded of the genocide through
commemoration on a daily basis can only feed his/her trauma symptoms, fears, and
negative feelings and perceptions toward the ‘‘other.’’ Moreover, the impoverished
conditions of many Tutsi survivors make matters worse as they claim that the
government largely ignores their call for compensation, increasing further their
post-conflict difficulties. A number of studies indicate that these material conditions
encourage the use of violence in order to remedy the miserable survival conditions.57
For Hutu, being identified as accomplices or suspected génocidaires, receiving no
acknowledgment for their sufferings and/or good deeds, and being marginalized
and stigmatized (often worsening their material conditions) in addition to their
post-conflict and post-genocide trauma symptoms (even if they are different than
the Tutsi’s) produces increasing resentment toward Tutsi. In these conditions where
psychological dispositions toward thinking in dualisms are reinforced, the potential
to resort to violence against the ‘‘other’’ appears to be increasingly likely.
Burkley-Zistel sustains that there is a ‘‘pretended’’ peace in Rwanda that is
supported by fear and pragmatism. In terms of pragmatism, the author explains
that living in an environment where ‘‘all depend on all,’’ means that ‘‘survival and
prosperity require collaboration.’’ 58 The gap between ‘‘us victims’’ and ‘‘them perpetrators’’ seems to have been continually and silently widened. Hence, this imposed
top-down ‘‘ethnic identity unity’’ and ‘‘consensus’’ do little to promote constructive
relationships between Tutsi and Hutu. These national initiatives conflict with any
form of psychological healing of individuals and communities. As each Rwandan
has to suppress his/her own suffering while trying to survive, openness toward the
‘‘other’’ has become unlikely.
This is basic psychology. Survey studies conducted in Northern Ireland indicate
that feelings of victimization of one’s party and competitive victimhood with the
adversary are negatively related to reconciliation.59 On the other hand, empathy
and perceptions of common identity with the antagonist was positively related to
reconciliation: ‘‘a full understanding of intergroup conflict requires changing the
relationships between the adversaries (e.g., to greater trust and constructive
cooperation) and attending to their psychological needs and feelings (e.g., needs for
justice and equality, feelings of victimization or guilt).’’ 60
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The ‘‘retributive spirit’’ (against Hutu) of Rwandan reconciliation processes
limits contact and open communication between parties, thus not contributing
positively to any form of reconciliation and, in fact, moving away from it. The dependence on finding a perpetrator means that justice becomes offender-oriented rather
than victim- and/or community-oriented; more retributive than restorative. As the
reconciliation initiatives remain focused on the perpetrator, the victim—conceived
as a passive agent—is essentially left aside from the reconciliation process and
deprived further from much-needed restoration. Victims and even perpetrators see
themselves as ‘‘victim,’’ and are unable to heal their post-conflict wounds when
the separation between them is reinforced and/or imposed. In this context, the
ground cannot be laid for one’s psychological re-orientation toward the ‘‘other’’:
‘‘Unaddressed hurts and injustices will fester and grow, and ultimately undermine
the best political or economic reform.’’ 61

A Restorative Justice Approach to Reconciliation
While impunity or amnesty for perpetrators is rejected among victims of large-scale
violent conflicts, victims of various conflicts do not appear to be focused on the perpetrators’ punishment.62 It has been observed that victims tend to prioritize diverse
measures to address the consequences of large-scale violence.63 Among those measures
we find: the acknowledgment of their injury, the reparation of harms (material and
non-material), and the emergence of the truth about what happened.
Pratto and Glasford argue that restorative justice will promote reconciliation
better than retributive justice.64 In criminology, restorative justice proponents argue
that it is better suited to victims’ needs since, ‘‘as the individual harmed,’’ the victim
is a key stakeholder in the ‘‘justice process.’’ Being considered as a central stakeholder, the victim has validation for his/her worth as a member of the community—
something that is often taken away from him/her by the violent act and is rarely
(only symbolically, if ever) restored by retributive justice.65
A restorative process is necessarily social and psychological. It allows the victim to
share his/her experience of victimization and its aftermath and to get an understanding of what happened from the perpetrator’s perspective. The victim decides whether
to accept offers for reparations or apologies, for instance. Via a restorative approach,
in addition to having a better understanding of what happened (psychological dimension), the victim can benefit from practical and material assistance usually direly
needed in post-conflict contexts. The victim might be worse off if the perpetrator
gets the ‘‘justly deserved’’ punishment. The victim will often feel more depressed,
overwhelmed, and/or disempowered because his/her needs have been disregarded,
in addition to seeing his/her wishes and expectations being denied. Indeed, as
trauma affects the victim in every spheres of his/her life, punishing the perpetrator
brings little to no improvement to his/her survival condition.
In addition to a restoration of the victim’s sufferings, restorative justice seeks
to restore the humanity of the perpetrator and his/her relationship with the victim.
As ‘‘an agent of the common good,’’ the perpetrator is asked to take responsibility for
his/ her actions.66 By asking ‘‘why,’’ the victim gives an opportunity to the perpetrator to become more human, an opening that retributive justice fails to provide.
Both parties can come to agree on the victim’s restoration. The perpetrator can
acknowledge his/her actions and the following consequences to victims and the
community; he/she is encouraged to accept responsibility for his/her deeds, face his/
her loved ones and his/her victim(s). When the perpetrators make amends, the end
product does not follow the principle of proportionality of retributive justice. The
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objective is aimed toward the victims’ needs and interests because restorative
justice prioritizes the victim’s restoration rather than the perpetrator’s punishment.
Without leaving the harmful and illegitimate deeds unpunished, restorative justice
restores, so to speak, the perpetrator’s humanity; he/she can become a functioning
and contributing member of the community again.
Focused on the harms done and their redress, restorative justice promotes the
separation between the perpetrator’s actions and identity. This approach lays the
ground for a different perception of the other’s behavior than inherent ‘‘evilness.’’ A
dialogue on the possibilities of change is more likely. In short, acknowledgment and
willingness to seek repairs can be a starting point for a broader reconsideration of
relationships among individuals, groups, communities, and societies.
It was argued previously that the distinction between victim and perpetrator are
muddied in the context of war,67 especially in the context of a genocide.68 Indeed,
genocide implies that whole communities are displaced or destroyed, neighbors turn
against neighbors via forced complicity or inbred distrust. The theoretical static
victim and perpetrator identities do not reflect the fluid and changing sets of identities of each individual. Of particular importance in this regard, the ethnic group
often determines who is constructed as a victim or as a perpetrator, as seen above
in the case of Rwanda. A restorative approach to justice allows more fluidity and
flexibility in the victim/perpetrator identification since its responses to harmful or
criminal behavior seeks, first, to repair the harm done (to individual, community,
society), and, second, to address the reactions and the needs of the parties involved,
and then to reintegrate the ‘‘author of the harmful or criminal deeds’’ and the
‘‘victim’’ into the community and society. In short, restorative justice emphasizes
the intersubjective relationships and their complexity, especially in post-conflict
settings. While restorative justice is not as easily implemented as the retributive
form, it seems necessary to facilitate the (re)humanization of both parties. It
promotes much needed intergroup contacts in order to (re)build wider social relationships within a deeply divided society.

Conclusion: Psychology, Reconciliation, Justice
This article challenged the improper separation between the ‘‘objective’’ and the
‘‘subjective’’ implicit in peacebuilding and transitional justice measures brought
about by the dichotomy victim/perpetrator found in the retributive form of justice.
Furthermore, it questioned the long-term effects of policies built upon such separation and polarization.
Transitional justice initiatives can become a tool that further reinforces the dichotomy victim/perpetrator rather than promote Rwandan reconciliation. In Rwanda,
gacaca courts are essentially retributive, thus reinforcing the victim/perpetrator
dichotomy. The knock-on effect is to further reinforce the exclusiveness of the perpetrator and the divide between the Tutsi and Hutu.
Retributive justice designates who is the victim and who is the perpetrator and
largely ignores, in post-conflict situations, the complexity of determining ‘‘who did
what to whom.’’ Inappropriately and unsubtly labeled and characterized, Tutsi and
Hutu have to face added hardships in silence—as each ‘‘objective category’’ is linked
to ‘‘privileges’’ (whatever they may be), to stigmatization, and/or marginalization—in
addition to their own post-conflict wounds. Further victimized as their sufferings are
increasing, it has become more difficult for one to acknowledge the sufferings of the
‘‘other,’’ and less likely for one’s psychological re-orientation toward the ‘‘other’’ to
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occur. Officially and overtly identified as victim or perpetrator, each antagonist sees
their view of the ‘‘other’’ confirmed or strengthened.
There may be no more official Tutsi and Hutu identities, but the victim/
perpetrator-génocidaires identities could be more powerful than the former in perpetuating the violence. The intensified negative emotions and cognitions, fear, dire
survival conditions, and so on, all constitute potential contributors to violence and
even genocide. The psychological and intersubjective dimensions of the traumatized
are clearly ignored in the reconciliation process, thus jeopardizing its prospects. Unless
all levels of reconciliation are considered in an inclusive and holistic way, fear, silence,
suppressed anger, hate, denial, among other things, will continue to prevail and to
work against reconciliation efforts at all levels. Projects and policies of reconciliation
and justice will bring durable peace only if they acknowledge and deal with the
intersubjective and psychological complexity of post-conflict environments.
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